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Abstract
The use of a casting vote to break ties is a common feature of majority voting schemes.
We consider the use of such schemes in amalgamating information in a common-interest
setting, such as a jury or panel of experts. They vote between two states of Nature, say
Innocent or Guilty. In a situation where jurors are heterogeneous in their ability to discern
the truth, how does the choice of the ability of the casting voter affect the reliability of
the verdict, that is, the probability that it is correct? Conventional wisdom, as followed in
practice, says that the most able voter should have the casting vote. On the contrary, we
show that for both honest and strategic voting, reliability for a three-person jury is always
maximized when the casting vote is given to the juror of median ability. For high ability
juries, but not otherwise, honest voting is as reliable as strategic voting. For somewhat
larger juries, it may even be best to give the casting vote to the juror of least ability.
To obtain our results, we require a model of private information in which jurors receive
signals in an interval, rather than simply binary signals. This allows modeling strength of
opinion.
Keywords: jury; casting vote; group decision
1 Introduction
The use of a casting vote to break ties is widespread in voting schemes. In this paper we
are concerned with whom the casting vote should be given to, where jury voting is used to
amalgamate information. By a jury, we refer to a panel of experts (of varying expertise) who
vote between two possible states of Nature, A or B. This might be “innocent” or “guilty”
for a judicial jury or judicial review panel of judges, or “rain” or “dry” for an expert panel of
weather forecasters. Also included in our framework is the peer review process for a journal,
where an editor would exercise her casting “vote” in the case where the two referees disagree.
The paper analyzes voting systems where an even number of jurors vote simultaneously for
one of the alternatives A or B and, in case of a tie, it is broken by a casting voter, who votes
in the knowledge of all the previous votes.
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In particular, we are concerned with jurors who are heterogeneous in their ability to deter-
mine the truth (alternative state A or B), and where these abilities are known to the casting
voter. A juror’s ability may relate to his expertise or experience. For a linesman in tennis, for
example, ability may relate to his location on the court or his eyesight. In the case of a tie,
the casting voter can bias his vote towards the alternative that had the higher ability jurors
voting for it. Conventional wisdom holds that the wisest or most senior juror should have the
casting vote. For example, a statute of the International Court of Justice (art. 12.4) states that
“in the event of an equality of votes among the judges, the eldest judge shall have a casting
vote”. This bias towards wisdom goes back as far as Aeschylus’ Eumenides, where Orestes is
acquitted on the casting vote of Athena. (As goddess of wisdom, she would certainly fit this
bias.) We find that conventional wisdom is wrong.
We address the titled question of “who should cast the casting vote?” in terms of the
reliability of the verdict, which we define as the probability that the verdict agrees with the
state of Nature, in other words, the probability that the jury “get’s it right”. For a given
set of jurors of known abilities, we ask which ability juror should be given the casting vote
to maximize reliability. We model the ability of a juror in terms of the stochastic nature of
private information sent to them as a signal. The private information available to jurors in our
model is somewhat deeper than that of, say, the Condorcet model (Condorcet 1785), where
this information is given in the form of binary signals, either for A or B. A juror’s ability in
that model is simply the probability that his signal is correct. We require richer signals that
measure strength of opinion, and come not in discrete form but as real numbers in the interval
[−1,+1]. To simplify matters, we assume that the alternatives A and B are equiprobable, each
having a prior probability of 1/2, although our results still hold for some perturbation of these
probabilities.
We mainly assume that jurors vote honestly, that is, for the alternative that is more likely,
given their signal and (in the case of the casting voter) the votes of the other jurors. In later
parts of the paper we also consider strategic voters, whose common aim is to maximize the
reliability, even if this means that an individual voter may have to vote for the alternative he
views as less likely to be true. For a jury of common interest of maximizing the reliability,
whether the jurors are honest or strategic, we answer the question: who should cast the casting
vote?
2 Examples and Literature
In this section we present some examples of casting vote schemes with known abilities of the
jurors and discuss the small literature on the subject.
An example of interest to academics is the refereeing process of conference or journal paper
submissions. In the latter, it is common to have two referees and an editor who can break ties.
Usually the editor will know the referees by reputation and can bias her casting vote towards
the one with more expertise in the area. For conference paper submissions, the expertise is
made more explicit. For example, the conference system EasyChair explicitly asks referees to
evaluate their relevant expertise by giving it one of five possible expertise levels.
There are numerous examples of three-person casting vote juries. For example, the selection
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committee for the Master of the Rolls (a senior post in the United Kingdom) is mandated as
follows, with the President of the Supreme Court given the casting vote: “The selection panel
comprises the President of the Supreme Court or his nominee as Chair, the Lord Chief Justice
or his nominee, the Chairman of the JAC or their nominee and a lay member of the JAC. The
Chairman of the panel has a casting vote in the event of a tie.”
In boxing, three man juries are common. A famous example, reported by the BBC on
February 20, 2000, was the following.
“Marco Antonio Barrera, WBO super-bantamweight champion, and WBC champ
Erik Morales squared up in Las Vegas for what will go down as one of the greatest
fights in boxing history. Unfortunately a fantastic contest was spoilt when Morales
was handed a controversial split decision by the judges. One judge each voted for
Morales and Barrera but the casting vote, of Dalby Shirley, was 115-113 in favour
of the Tijuana man. ”
The literature on what we call jury voting goes back to the so-called Condorcet Jury
Theorem, Condorcet (1785). We have not found any analytical work on the casting vote, but
sequential (or roll-call) voting has received some attention. Principal papers in this area are
Dekel and Piccione (2000) and Ottaviani & Sorenson (2001). See also the working paper of
Alpern & Chen (2014), which contains numerical work on voting order in roll-call voting. For
large juries, roll-call voting is clearly far from casting voting, as the first n − 1 jurors vote
sequentially rather than simultaneously. On the other hand, perhaps for a jury of three the
similarities are stronger, as it is only the second juror who has different information in the two
schemes. The importance of voting order on selection committees with vetoes is demonstrated
in Alpern, Gal & Solan (2010). A general investigation of what we call jury voting is given in
Ali et al. (2008). Our work would fit into the information amalgamation portion of the survey
of Dewan & Shepsle (2011). In discussing the work of Dekel & Piccione (2000), they observe
that “because voters condition on the same event, namely that of being pivotal, it makes no
difference whether they cast their votes sooner or later.” Our contrary results, where voting
order matters, is due to the heterogenous abilities of our voters and the continuous nature of
their private signals, and so it matters to the later, or casting, voter which early voters went
for A and which went for B. If those voting for A were overall of significantly higher abilities,
then the casting voter might vote against his weak signal for B (assuming a tie vote). Dewan
and Shepsle take account of this fact in a footnote where they say that “the individual with
the casting vote conditions her vote on the set of observed actions.”
Dekel & Piccione (2000) also take account of voting order (in sequential voting) and con-
clude that (p. 48):
“. . . if voters are endowed ex ante with differential information (some voters
can be better informed than other) knowing which voters voted in favor and which
against can affect the choice of a later voter. It can be shown that, in a common-
value and two signal environment (as in Sec. IIIC above), if the player’s signals
are completely ordered (in the sense of Blackwell), then it is optimal to have the
better informed vote earlier. This provides an interesting contrast to the findings
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of Ottaviani and Sorensen (1998). They obtain the opposite optimal order in an
environment in which information providers care not about the outcome but about
appearing to be well informed. It is not difficult, however, to construct examples
in which having the best-informed voter vote first is not optimal. Hence in seems
unlikely that general insights into this question can be obtained.”
3 The Model
Our model is one of majority voting between two alternative states of Nature, A or B. There
are an odd number n of jurors, or voters. First n − 1 of them vote simultaneously. Then the
casting juror votes, with knowledge of the earlier voting. It does not matter if the casting voter
only votes in the case of a tie or always votes. To specify the model, we have to define what
we mean by the ability of each juror, and how his ability (and the state of Nature) determines
the distribution of signals that he receives as private information. We then define threshold
strategies that determine a juror’s vote, based on his signal and any prior voting he is aware
of (if he is the casting voter). Finally, we define what we mean by honest voting and strategic
voting.
3.1 Signals and Abilities
We assume two states of Nature A and ∼ A = B, with a priori probability of A given by
Pr(A) = θ0. To simplify the analysis we will assume the equiprobable case θ0 = 1/2, although
our results are robust for θ0 values around 1/2. Individuals have private information about
the state of Nature modeled as a signal s in the signal interval [−1,+1]. Positive signals are
indications of A; negative signals B. The signal s = 0 is neutral. Higher positive signals
indicate A more strongly; similarly for negative signals and B. Thus a better signal is one with
a higher absolute value.
Individual jurors have an ability a in the ability interval A = [0, 1], where individuals of
higher ability are generally (but not always) able to make better guesses about the state of
Nature. When Nature is in state A (resp. B), jurors receive independent signals s ∈ [−1, 1]
with probability density given by fa(s) (resp. ga(s)) if they have ability a. We make the
simplest nontrivial assumption on fa(s) and ga(s), namely that they are linear in s. The slope
of the density functions fa(s) and ga(s) for a juror of ability a is proportional to a. Given that
fa and ga(s) are density functions on [−1,+1], they take the following form:
fa(s) = (1 + as)/2, −1 ≤ s ≤ +1, when Nature is A;
ga(s) = (1− as)/2, −1 ≤ s ≤ +1, when Nature is B.
It is easily checked that fa(·) and ga(·) defined above are indeed density functions for any
0 ≤ a ≤ 1. The density functions for ability a = 2/3 are shown in Figure 1. The probability
of a correct signal, that is positive when Nature is A, is the area under the A line (and above
the s axis) to the right of s = 0. When a = 1/2, this area is 1/2, showing that a juror with
ability 0 is just guessing (by flipping a fair coin to determine the state of Nature).
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Figure 1: Plots of signal densities fa(a) for A and ga(s) for B
The corresponding cumulative distributions of the signal s when Nature is A or B are given
by {
Fa(s) = (s+ 1)(as− a+ 2)/4, −1 ≤ s ≤ +1, when Nature is A;
Ga(s) = (s+ 1)(a− as+ 2)/4, −1 ≤ s ≤ +1, when Nature is B. (1)
Given only his signal s, a juror of ability a has a posterior probability θ′ that Nature is A,
given by Bayes’ Law as
θ′ = Pr(A\s) = θ0fa(s)
θ0f(a, s) + (1− θ0)ga(s) (2)
=
θ0 + asθ0
2asθ0 − as+ 1 (where θ0 is prior probability of A)
= (as+ 1)/2 (in the equiprobable case θ0 = 1/2).
Note that for a juror of ability 0, we have θ′ = θ for any received signal s, reinforcing our
notion that ability 0 is no ability at all. A juror of ability 0 can do no more than guess. If we
wish to view our juror of ability a as a Condorcet juror, we would say that his probability of
a correct signal (positive when Nature is A or negative when Nature is B) is given by∫ 1
0
fa(s) ds = (2 + a)/4. (3)
In particular a juror of ability 0 has only a 50% probability of a correct sign signal, while a
boffin of maximum ability 1 gets it right 75% of the time.
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Figure 2: Voting based on signal and threshold
3.2 Threshold Strategies and Honest Strategies
A strategy for a juror is a threshold τ , depending on previous voting, if any, such that the
juror votes A with signal s ≥ τ and B with signal s < τ (see Figure 2 for an illustration). A
strategy profile is a list of strategies for each juror. So in our model of three jurors, with a
casting vote, the two first voters have single thresholds x and y. We can number the jurors by
their voting order, although in our model the order of the first n− 1 is arbitrary. The casting
voter has two thresholds zAB (if the prior voting was AB) and zBA (if the prior voting was
BA). We can ignore the case of prior voting AA or BB, because in that case the last vote
does not matter. So a strategy profile is a four-tuple (x, y, zAB, zBA).
Definition 1. We say a strategy profile is honest (or naive) if the thresholds are such that
every juror votes for the alternative that he believes is more likely, given the a priori probability
of A, his private signal, and any prior voting.
In our casting vote model, with neutral (equiprobable) alternatives A and B, honest voting
requires that the two first jurors have 0 thresholds (x = y = 0) since for θ0 = 1/2 we have by
(2) that Pr(A/s) = 1/2 + as/2 > 1/2 if and only if s > 0. This should be clear in any case
from the symmetry of our model with respect to A and B. In other words, with honest voting
early jurors (all but casting voter) each vote A with a positive signal and B with a negative
signal. The situation for the casting voter is a bit different. We may relabel the alternatives
so that the higher-ability early juror voted A and the lower-ability early juror voted B. If the
casting voter gets a positive signal (for A) then obviously he votes A and that is the majority
verdict. If however he agrees with the early voter of lower ability (he gets a negative signal),
then his honest vote depends on the strength of his signal versus the ability discrepancy of the
early voters. Given their abilities, he will have a negative threshold τ . If his own signal is even
more negative, he follows his signal and vote B. Otherwise he will base his vote on the fact
that while the early voters split their votes, those of higher ability voted for A. This is the
crux of the matter — the only case in which the casting voter will vote differently than if he
had been voting simultaneously with the others.
3.3 Honest Thresholds of the Casting Voter
In this section we analyze the problem faced by the casting voter, who knows the voting,
abilities and thresholds of the first two voters. What is his honest threshold? We assume
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the first two voters have ability a with threshold x and ability b with threshold y. We now
determine the optimal threshold of the third juror of ability c > 0 (the case of c = 0 will
be considered shortly after), under the assumption that the a priori probability of A (before
the casting voter receives his signal s), given the previous voting and thresholds, is θ. If
the casting voter has signal s, then his posteriori probability of A is given by θ′ where θ′ =
θfc(s)/(θfc(s) + (1− θ)gc(s)), or
θ′ =
θ + csθ
2csθ − cs+ 1 .
The honest threshold z is the value of s for which θ′ = 1/2, or
1
2
=
θ + csθ
2csθ − cs+ 1 .
Solving for s and making this value the honest threshold z gives
z =
1− 2θ
c
. (4)
Of course, if (1 − 2θ)/c > 1 this means always vote B (same as threshold z = 1), and if
(1− 2θ)/c > 1 this means always vote A (same as threshold z = −1). We can use sided limit
c→ 0+ to make the same arguments if c = 0
Now let us consider how to determine the above value of θ given the prior voting sequence
AB (i.e., the voter of ability a votes A and the voter of ability b votes B). This value is given
by
θ(AB) =
θ0(1− Fa(x))Fb(y))
θ0(1− Fa(x))Fb(x) + (1− θ0)(1−Ga(x))Gb(y) (5)
=
(2 + a+ ax)(2 + b(−1 + y))
2(4 + ab(1 + x)(−1 + y)) , (6)
where the second equality is due to (1) and θ0 = 1/2. For the case of honest voting, the
thresholds x and y of the early voters are 0, so (6) reduces to
θ(AB) =
(2 + a)(2− b)
8− 2ab . (7)
According to (4) we then have
zAB =
1− 2θ(AB)
c
= w(a, b, c) ≡ 2(b− a)
c(4− ab) , (8)
and similarly
zBA = −zAB = −w(a, b, c) = 2(a− b)
c(4− ab) . (9)
To illustrate the importance of these calculations, consider the threshold of the casting voter
when the early voters have similar abilities and the ability of the casting voter is large. For
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example suppose the early voters have abilities 0.5 and 0.6 and the ability of the casting voter
is 0.8. Then if the voter of ability 0.5 votes A and the voter of ability 0.6 votes B, the threshold
for the casting voter of ability 0.8 is given by equation (8) as 2(0.1)/(0.8(4−0.3)) ' 0.068. Thus
the signal of the casting voter has to be just a bit above neutral 0 for him to vote A. However,
if the early voters have widely different abilities, say 0.1 and 0.9, while the casting voter has
ability 0.2, the threshold of the casting voter will be 2(0.8)/(0.2(4− (0.1)(0.9))) = 2.046. Since
this is greater than 1, it means the casting voter will always copy the vote of the stronger early
voter, regardless of his own signal.
3.4 Reliability
We define the reliability of a voting scheme as the probability that the majority verdict is correct
under this voting scheme. With equiprobable alternatives, a simple symmetry argument shows
this is the same as the probability of majority verdict A when Nature is in state A. It is easy
to calculate the reliability under honest voting scheme where the early voters have abilities
a1, a2, . . . , an−1 and the casting voter has ability an. We ask the simple question: Given a
set of n abilities, which one of these should have the casting vote if we wish to maximize the
reliability of honest voting? For a jury of size three, we will show that honest-voting reliability
is maximized when the juror of median ability has the casting vote. An alternative approach,
also within the purview of our model, ascribes costs to each type of voting error (verdict A
when Nature is B and vice versa) and minimizes the expected cost.
We now evaluate reliability Q(a, b, c), the probability of a correct verdict when θ0 = 1/2,
where the jurors have abilities a, b and c (in voting order) and honest thresholds x = y = 0. As
the theoretical voting order of the early voters (who vote simultaneously) does not matter, we
clearly have Q(a, b, c) = Q(b, a, c). Let qA (resp. qB) denote the probability of majority verdict
A (resp. B) when Nature is A (resp. B). Then for an arbitrary a priori probability θ0 of A we
have that the reliability Q(a, b, c) is given by
Q(a, b, c) = θ0 qA(a, b, c) + (1− θ0) qB(a, b, c).
Hence with neutral alternatives θ0 = 1/2, we have
Q(a, b, c) =
1
2
(qA(a, b, c) + qB(a, b, c)),
and symmetry gives the simpler formula
q(a, b, c) = qA(a, b, c) = qB(a, b, c). (10)
From now on we assume the case of neutral alternatives. As long as |zAB| < 1, the formula
for qA(a, b, c) is given by summing up the probabilities of voting patterns AA, ABA and BAA,
as
qA(a, b, c) = (1− F (a, 0))(1− F (b, 0)) + (1− F (a, 0))F (b, 0)(1− F (c, zAB)))
+ F (a, 0)(1− F (b, 0))(1− F (c, zBA))), (11)
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with a similar formula for qB. Then according to (8), (9), and (10) provided |zAB| < 1, we
have Q(a, b, c) = q(a, b, c), where
q(a, b, c) =
1
32
(4(4 + a+ b) +
4(a− b)2
(4− ab)c + (4− ab)c). (12)
In the case |zAB| ≥ 1, the casting voter follows the vote of the early voter of maximum ability,
that is, the one of ability max {a, b} in our notation. We have calculated the probability that
is juror gets the correct sign signal in (3). So in the above calculation of q(a, b, c), by replacing
zAB with −1 and +1 respectively if zAB ≤ −1 and zAB ≥ +1, we get the more general
reliability formula
Q(a, b, c) =
{
q(a, b, c), if |w(a, b, c)| < 1;
(max{a, b}+ 2)/4, otherwise. (13)
Note that q(a, b, c) = (max{a, b} + 2)/4 when |zAB| = 1. This indicates the fact that in this
case the early juror of higher ability is a dictator, whose private signal alone determines the
verdict as his vote will be copied by the casting voter. To summarize, we have the single
formula q(a, b, c) for the reliability when the casting voter has a history-dependent threshold
|zAB| < 1, and a more complicated formula Q(a, b, c) without this assumption. Thus Q applies
even when the casting voter has extreme thresholds whereby he can vote without looking at
his private signal.
For example, suppose we partition the ability interval [0, 1] into three subintervals of length
1/3, and take a jury with one juror in the middle of each of these subintervals. That is, we
have a uniformly distributed jury of abilities 1/6, 1/2 and 5/6. If the high-ability juror has the
casting vote (c = 5/6 in the above notation), then zAB ' 0.204, which lies within the signal
interval [−1, 1] and so reliability is given by the formula q(1/6, 1/2, 5/6) ' 0.690. Similarly, if
the juror of middle-ability 1/2 has the casting vote, then zAB ' 0.691. As this is also in the
signal interval, the reliability is given by q(1/6, 5/6, 1/2) ' 0.714. Finally, if the weakest juror
has the casting vote, then |zAB| = 48/43 > 1. This means that the casting voter follows the vote
of the juror of ability 5/6 = max{1/2, 5/6}, who is correct with probability (2+5/6)/4 ' 0.708
by formula (13). So in this case we have calculated that giving the casting vote to the median-
ability juror is best, to the lowest-ability voter is second best, and to the highest-ability voter
is worst. We plot these reliabilities in Figure 3, mainly for later comparison with our results
for larger juries.
4 Mechanism Design
We now consider the main question of the paper, the problem faced by a designer who is given
a fixed set of jurors with known abilities and must decide to whom to give the casting vote.
(Perhaps he is organizing a sporting event and has three volunteers for refereeing, who come
with eyesight certificates. Or maybe he is writing the constitution of the International Court
of Justice and has to say which judge has the casting vote.) We suppose here that there are
three jurors and their abilities a, b, c are labeled so that a ≤ b ≤ c. (Note that we have changed
our labelling conventions from the last section, where c was always the ability of the casting
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Figure 3: Reliability comparison
voter.) In the last section we gave an example with uniformly distributed abilities 1/6, 1/2
and 5/6, where we showed that it was best for the juror of ability 1/2 to have the casting vote,
with the juror of ability 1/6 second best. Here we will discuss the problem more generally.
To aid the intuition, we carry out a thought experiment where the casting vote scheme is
conducted in another equivalent way. We let all the jurors vote simultaneously. If the verdict
is close (2 to 1, or (n + 1)/2 to (n − 1)/2) we are allowed to pick one of the jurors and let
him decide whether to change his vote after viewing the other votes (and with knowledge of
everyone’s ability). If he voted with the minority, changing his vote will not affect the verdict,
so we assume he voted with the majority, say A. This means the others voted equally for A
and B. He will only change his vote if this increases the reliability of the verdict, that is, if he
now thinks B is more likely than A, despite his positive signal for A. This will occur if one of
the following two things occurs:
1. He has a weak signal s close 0.
2. The overall abilities of the B voters are significantly higher than that of the A voters.
In the case of a jury of three, condition 1 is most likely to be satisfied when the juror
has the weakest ability a, or more generally when the juror has the smallest ability. This is
because in our model small abilities are more likely to produce weak signals. Condition 2 is
most likely, for a jury of three, when the abilities of the other two jurors are as far apart as
possible. That is, when they have the two extreme abilities. This occurs when the selected
juror has the middle ability. So this intuitive and qualitative analysis leads us to believe that
in general the casting voter should have a low or middle signal. Our later analysis for larger
juries indeed bears this out. Here we show that for a jury of three the forces (condition 2)
favoring the middle or median ability juror outweigh the forces (condition 1) favoring the low
ability juror. In particular we have our following main result.
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Theorem 1. Suppose that A and B are equiprobable and we have three honest jurors of abilities
a, b, c with 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ 1. Then the reliability Q is maximized when the juror of median
ability b has the casting vote.
Proof. The idea of our proof is simple: starting with the case where the juror of ability b has
the casting vote, we show that reliability cannot increase when he is replaced in that role by
the juror of either higher ability c or lower ability a. Let S = {(a, b, c) : 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ 1}.
Denote
∆1(a, b, c) = Q(a, c, b)−Q(a, b, c);
∆2(a, b, c) = Q(a, c, b)−Q(b, c, a).
Then our aforementioned simple idea is implemented by showing that both ∆1(a, b, c) and
∆2(a, b, c) are non-negative for any (a, b, c) ∈ S. First of all, the following are straightforward
according to definition (8) for any given (a, b, c) ∈ S:
w(b, c, a) ≥ 1⇔ P1(a, b, c) ≡ abc− 4a− 2b+ 2c ≥ 0; (14)
w(a, c, b) ≥ 1⇔ P2(a, b, c) ≡ abc− 2a− 4b+ 2c ≥ 0; (15)
w(a, b, c) = 2(b− a)/(c(4− ab)) ≤ (2/3)(b/c) < 1. (16)
Depending on the magnitude of w(a, c, b) ≥ 0 for any given (a, b, c) ∈ S, we consider two
possible cases separately.
Case 1: w(a, c, b) ≥ 1.
According to (13), we have
Q(a, c, b) = (c+ 2)/4. (17)
Since P1(a, b, c)− P2(a, b, c) ≥ 2(b− a) ≥ 0, it follows from (14) and (15) that
w(a, c, b) ≥ 1⇒ w(b, c, a) ≥ 1,
which together with (13) implies that Q(b, c, a) = (c+2)/4, and hence ∆2(a, b, c) = Q(a, c, b)−
Q(b, c, a) = 0.
Next we prove the more difficult result ∆1(a, b, c) ≥ 0. According to (16) and (13) we have
Q(a, b, c) = q(a, b, c). It follows from (17) that
∆1(a, b, c) =
c+ 2
4
− q(a, b, c) = d3(a, b, c)
32c(4− ab) ,
where
d3(a, b, c) ≡ −4a2 + 8ab− 4b2 − 16ac− 16bc
+4a2bc+ 4ab2c+ 16c2 − a2b2c2.
So it remains only to establish that d3(a, b, c) ≥ 0 given the additional condition 2b ≤ c, which
is implied by (15). In Section A.2 of the Appendix we show that d3(a, b, c) has a minimum of
0 over the set S ∩ {(a, b, c) : 2b ≤ c}, which is attained uniquely at the point a = b = c = 0.
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Case 2: w(a, c, b) < 1.
According to (13), we have Q(a, c, b) = q(a, c, b), which together with (16) implies that
∆1(a, b, c) = q(a, c, b)− q(a, b, c) = (c− b)d1(a, b, c)
8bc(4− ab)(4− ac) ,
where
d1(a, b, c) ≡ 4a2 − 8ab+ 4b2 − 8ac+ 4bc
+2a2bc− ab2c+ 4c2 − abc2.
By taking partial derivatives we can easily see that d1(a, b, c) is monotonically decreasing in b
and c, which implies that d1(a, b, c) ≥ d1(a, a, a) = 0 and hence ∆1(a, b, c) ≥ 0. Let us now
show ∆2(a, b, c) ≥ 0. If w(b, c, a) ≥ 1, then Q(b, c, a) = (c+ 2)/4 and we have
∆2(a, b, c) = q(a, c, b)− c+ 2
4
=
(P2(a, b, c))
2
32b(4− ac) ≥ 0.
If w(b, c, a) < 1 (note that we always have w(b, c, a) ≥ 0), with (13) we have Q(b, c, a) =
q(b, c, a) and hence
∆2(a, b, c) = q(a, c, b)− q(b, c, a) = (b− a)d2(a, b, c)
8ab(4− ac)(4− bc) ,
where
d2(a, b, c) ≡ −4a2 − 4ab− 4b2 + 8ac+ 8bc
+a2bc+ ab2c− 4c2 − 2abc2,
In Section A.1 of the Appendix we show that the minimum of d2(a, b, c) over the intersection
of S and the set {(a, b, c) : w(b, c, a) ≤ 1} is 0. Hence ∆2(a, b, c) ≥ 0. 
Minimizing Expected Cost
Let us consider an alternative voting goal. Instead of maximizing the reliability, suppose we
wish to minimize the expected cost of making both types of error: (I) verdict B when Nature is
A (e.g., acquittal of a guilty defendant); and (II) verdict A when Nature is B (e.g., conviction
of an innocent defendant). Similar to (11), we can calculate the probability of making either
type of error, Pr[B/A] or Pr[A/B]. Recall that in Section 3.4 we defined qA and qB as the
probability of correct verdict when Nature is in state A and B, respectively. Therefore,
Pr[B/A] = 1− qA, and Pr[A/B] = 1− qB.
Let k1, k2 ≥ 0 denote the cost of type-I and type-II error, respectively. Then the total expected
cost of making both types of error under honest voting with voting order (a, b, c) (casting vote
to c) is given by
K(a, b, c) = k1 Pr[B/A] + k2 Pr[A/B]
= k1(1− qA(a, b, c)) + k2(1− qB(a, b, c)) = (k1 + k2)(1− q(a, b, c)),
where the last equality is due to (10), with which we have shown the following.
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Proposition 2. For a three-person jury under honest voting, the voting order with maximum
reliability also minimizes the expected cost of incorrect verdict, making both types of error.
5 Larger Juries with Uniformly Distributed Abilities
Our main result of Theorem 1 has been established algebraically only for juries of size three.
Such analysis seems out of reach for larger juries with arbitrary sets of abilities. However, if we
take a jury of size n with uniformly distributed abilities, we can determine numerically which
juror should be given the casting vote to maximize reliability under honest voting. We divide
the ability interval [0, 1] into n subintervals of length 1/n and give one juror i the ability of
the midpoint of the ith interval, so that ai = (2i− 1)/(2n) for the ith juror in the jury of size
n. As an example, when n = 5, the abilities of the five jurors are 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9. For
each jury of size n, let Q¯n denote the reliability of simultaneous voting and Qn[i] denote the
reliability of casting voting with the casting vote given to the ith juror, the one of ability ai.
We then define the non-negative quntities
δ(n, ai) = Qn[i]− Q¯n
as the incremental reliability of casting voting. It turns out that calculating δ(n, ai) is easier
than calculating Qn[i] directly. For fixed n, the reliability of giving the casting vote to juror i
is maximized when δ(n, ai) is maximized over ai. Figure 4 plots for n = 3, 5, 7 the incremental
reliability δ(n, ai) when the casting vote on the jury of size n is given to the juror of ability ai,
i = 1, . . . , n. For each n, the plotted points are connected by straight lines to make the plot
easier to read.
The curve for n = 3 has three plot points at abilities 1/6, 1/2 and 5/6. As known from
Theorem 1, the highest value will be for the median ability 1/2, as shown clearly in the curve
for n = 3. We have already seen this curve, on its own, in Figure 3, without the substraction
of Q¯3. For the jury of size n = 5, the abilities of the jurors are 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, and
the incremental reliability (and hence the absolute reliability) is maximized when the second
lowest ability juror (ability 0.3) has the casting vote. For n = 7, reliability is maximized when
the juror of lowest ability is given the casting vote. The pattern for n = 7 is continued for
larger juries, as shown in Figure 5 for juries of size n = 9, 11, 13, 15, where incremental (or
absolute) reliability is decreasing in the ability of the casting voter. To distinguish between the
curves for different values of n, note that at their left points, the curves are n = 9, 11, 15, 13,
counting from the top. Also observe that these figures are not useful for comparing reliability
of different size juries, as they have different base points Q¯n. The idea that larger juries have
higher reliability goes back to Condorcet, but that is not our point of discussion here.
The mathematical analysis required to calculate the incremental radiabilities is presented
in Section A.3 of the Appendix.
6 Strategic Voting
Up to this point in the paper we have been assuming that jurors vote honestly, for the alter-
native they believe is more likely at the time of their vote. In particular, this assumption sets
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Figure 5: Plots of δ(n, ·), n = 9, 11, 13, 15
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x = y = 0 for the early voter thresholds. However, sometimes removing this restriction and
allowing what we call strategic voting can increase the reliability of the majority verdict. In
this section we consider how to optimize the early voter thresholds x and y in the three-person
jury in order to maximize the resulting reliability, i.e., the reliability under strategic voting
scheme, which we denote by Qˆ.
Let us consider the following example of a jury consisting of two yokels (of near 0 abilities)
who are early voters, and a boffin (of ability near 1) who has the casting vote. With honest
voting and the boffin as casting voter, the two yokels might make the same wrong vote (the
wrong guess). This will occur with probability roughly 1/4. Even if the yokels split their votes
(which occurs roughly half the time), the boffin will still get it wrong 1/4 of the time, so the
reliability of such an honest vote is only about 1 − 1/4 − 1/8 = 5/8. This can also be seen
as q(0, 0, 1) = 5/8 from equation (12). If the thresholds of the early voters (in this case the
yokels) are chosen strategically, the reliability of the majority verdict can be improved. Clearly
reliability is maximized if the two yokels vote against each other and thus let the boffin, who
votes honestly, decide the verdict. This means one yokel has threshold +1 (always votes B)
and the other yokel has threshold −1 (always votes A). When the abilities of the two early
voters are sufficiently low with respect to that of the casting voter, so that optimally they vote
against each other, we call such a situation Two Yokels and a Boffin (2Y1B). Such strategic
voting has reliability near 3/4. If we view this as an optimization problem (which we do)
where the foreman simply chooses the strategy profile and tells everyone what thresholds to
adopt, there is no problem. If we view the problem as a common interest game where every
player has as his utility the probability of a correct verdict, then the above profile is a Nash
equilibrium, and there is a corresponding coordination problem to determine which equilibrium
(which yokel votes A) to adopt. But we can let the jurors talk to each other before they receive
their signals.
In any case, it is useful to observe that the casting voter should always vote honestly, as
for him there is no distinction between having his vote correct and having the majority vote
correct, as they are identical.
We restrict our analysis to a jury of n = 3 voters. For a given voting order of abilities (a, b, c)
(voters with abilities a and b vote first and the casting voter has ability c) the reliability of
the majority verdict depends on the thresholds of the jurors. Recall that the early voters have
single thresholds x and y, which are now no longer required to be 0. In general, they should not
vote honestly. The casting voter has two thresholds zAB (if the first votes were AB) and zBA
(if the first votes were BA). Note that, in honest voting the casting voter wants to maximize
the probability that his own vote is correct, while in strategic voting he wants to maximize the
probability that the majority verdict is correct. Since for the casting voter, after a tie, his vote
is the majority verdict, we conclude that a strategic casting voter is also honest. Therefore,
the optimal thresholds for the casting voter are his honest thresholds, which we have already
calculated in (4) as (1− 2θ)/c, where c is his ability and θ, as calculated in (5), is his a priori
probability for alternative A, before receiving his signal. The reliability of the majority verdict
under strategic voting can be calculated as follows:
Qˆ(a, b, c) =
1
2
max
−1≤x, y≤+1
(
QˆA(a, b, c, x, y) + QˆB(a, b, c, x, y)
)
, (18)
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where QˆA(a, b, c, x, y) (resp. QˆB(a, b, c, x, y)) is the probability that the verdict is A (resp. B)
when nature is in state A (resp. B), that is, the sum of the probabilities of voting sequences
AA (resp. BB), ABA (resp. BAB) and BAA (resp. ABB) when Nature is A (resp. B), or
QˆA(a, b, c, x, y) = (1− Fa(x))(1− Fb(y)) + (1− Fa(x))Fb(y)(1− Fc(zAB))
+Fa(x)(1− Fb(y))(1− Fc(zBA));
QˆB(a, b, c, x, y) = Ga(x)Gb(y) +Ga(x)(1−Gb(y))Gc(zBA)
+(1−Ga(x))Gb(y)Gc(zAB);
where zAB and zBA are known functions (8) and (9) of x and y according to (6).
We denote the optimizing values for the thresholds x and y of the early voters as x¯ =
x¯(a, b, c) and y¯ = y¯(a, b, c). For example, when a = 0.22, b = 0.6 and c = 0.7 the strategic
thresholds are approximately x¯ = 0.68 and y¯ = −0.30. Notice that the early juror with smaller
ability of 0.22 is thrown off the neutral threshold of 0 more than the one with larger ability. A
useful way of measuring the discrepancy of strategic thresholds from their honest counterparts
is via what we call the dishonesty function d given by
d = d(a, b, c) = |x¯(a, b, c)|+ |y¯(a, b, c)|.
In this notation a strategy profile is honest if it has d = 0. In such cases we have Q(a, b, c) =
Qˆ(a, b, c), although in general the right-hand side can be higher. The 2Y1B situation described
earlier, where a and b are small and c is close to 1, has thresholds which result in the two yokels
(the early voters with small abilities) voting against each other. That is, one always votes A
(threshold −1) while the other always votes B (threshold +1), so that d = 2, the maximum
dishonesty. Figure 6 plots d on the vertical axis for c = 1 and a and b on the interval [0, 1].
Note that there are two flat surfaces. One has height d = 0 for high values of both a and
b, which corresponds to honest voting (Q = Qˆ, x¯ = y¯ = 0). The other has height d = 2, for
small values of a and b (yokels), which corresponds to the region of 2Y1B. When the ability
of the casting voter is lowered to 0.6, the plot of dishonesty d changes as shown in its contour
plot in Figure 7, where the bounding curves of the regions d = 0 and d = 2 are drawn. We see
that the region of honest strategic voting is enlarged and the region of 2Y1B gets smaller.
The figures seem to suggest that when all the abilities are high, honest voting is strategic.
That is, Q = Qˆ with x¯ = y¯ = 0. Indeed we establish this for a discrete set of abilities in
Theorem 4. It should be noted that dishonesty in our setting is not a bad thing. Rather d is
the optimal amount of total individual dishonesty required for the jury as a whole to maximize
the reliability, a good thing.
We present our further findings in the following two theorems with details of the supporting
computational results presented in Section A.4 of the Appendix. Let A0 = {0, 1/10, . . . , 1} be
a set of discrete abilities.
Theorem 3. Given a three-person jury of abilities a, b, c ∈ A0 with a ≤ b ≤ c, reliability is
maximized under strategic voting when the juror of median-ability b has the casting vote.
Theorem 4. Given a three-person jury of abilities a, b, c ∈ A0 with a, b, c ≥ 0.6, honest voting
is strategic for any fixed voting order. In other words, the maximum in (18) is achieved for
x = y = 0.
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Note that Theorem 3 gives the same conclusion as Theorem 1 but with different setting:
strategic rather than honest voting. This result, logically distinct from Theorem 1, is estab-
lished for discrete abilities. For abilities all high enough so that Theorem 4 applies, Theorem 1
and Theorem 4 do have as a consequence of Theorem 3.
7 Conclusions
Majority voting schemes with a casting vote in the case of a tie are widespread. The rationale
for such schemes is rarely if ever laid out. Of course, such a scheme avoids an inconclusive
verdict. We have observed in this paper that one effect of such a scheme with respect to fully
simultaneous voting is that the reliability of the verdict, the probability that it is correct, is
increased. Conventional wisdom has it that the casting vote should be given to the ablest, or
senior, voter (juror), and such a stipulation can be found in many situations. We do not know
the reasoning behind this stipulation, but if it is to optimize the reliability of the verdict then
it is clearly wrong. In some cases (large, honest juries) the ablest juror is in fact the worst
person to whom to give the casting vote. On a positive note, we have established algebraically
that for an honest three-person jury with a fixed set of abilities, the casting vote should be
given to the juror of median ability. We have established the same fact numerically for the
case where the jury votes strategically to maximize the reliability of their verdict. We have
also shown that when all jurors have a high ability, they can simply vote in an honest fashion
for the alternative they deem most likely, and this still results in the optimal reliability of the
verdict. Of course, as shown with the example of two yokels and a boffin, other juries may
have to vote very strategically to optimize the reliability of their verdict. We remark that,
the aforementioned results are robust for perturbations of the a priori probability θ0 = 1/2
of alternative A. We believe that the techniques introduced in this paper can be successfully
adapted to other sequential voting schemes, such as roll-call voting.
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of d2(a, b, c) ≥ 0 in Theorem 1
For minimization of d2(a, b, c) subject to (a, b, c) ∈ S and P2(a, b, c) ≤ 0, the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions for potential minimizers are as follows:
2abc− 8a+ b2c− 2bc2 + λ1(bc− 4)− 4b+ 8c− λ2 + λ3 = 0,
a2c+ 2abc− 2ac2 + λ1(ac− 2)− 4a− 8b+ 8c− λ3 + λ4 = 0,
a2b+ ab2 − 4abc+ λ1(ab+ 2) + 8a+ 8b− 8c− λ4 + λ5 = 0,
λ1(abc− 4a− 2b+ 2c) = 0,
aλ2 = 0, λ3(b− a) = 0, λ4(c− b) = 0, (1− c)λ5 = 0.
λ1, . . . , λ5 ≥ 0; (a, b, c) ∈ S and P2(a, b, c) ≤ 0.
All solutions (a, b, c, λ1, . . . , λ5) of the above system projected to the (a, b, c) space form the
following set Smin:
Smin = {(0, b, b) : 0 ≤ b ≤ 1} ∪ {(aλ, aλ, aλ) : 0 < λ ≤ 3}
∪{(a, a, a/(a2 + 2)) : 0 < a ≤ 3−
√
7}
where aλ is the middle root of equation a(4 − a2) = λ. Since d2(a, b, c) = 0 for any (a, b, c) ∈
Smin, all elements of Smin are minimizers of d2(a, b, c).
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A.2 Proof of d3(a, b, c) ≥ 0 in Theorem 1
For minimization of d3(a, b, c) subject to (a, b, c) ∈ S and c−2b ≥ 0, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
for potential minimizers are as follows:
−2ab2c2 + 8abc− 8a+ 4b2c+ 8b− 16c− λ2 + λ3 = 0,
−2a2bc2 + 4a2c+ 8abc+ 8a− 8b− 16c+ 2λ1 − λ3 = 0,
−2a2b2c+ 4a2b+ 4ab2 − 16a− 16b+ 32c− λ1 + λ4 = 0,
λ1(c− 2b) = 0, aλ2 = 0, λ3(b− a) = 0, (1− c)λ4 = 0.
λ1, . . . , λ4 ≥ 0; (a, b, c) ∈ S and c− 2b ≥ 0.
The above system has a unique solution of (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) and d3(0, 0, 0) = 0. Hence we have
d3(a, b, c) ≥ 0.
A.3 Analysis of Large Juries for Section 5
Here we give the analysis of the casting vote scheme for an arbitrary odd number of jurors
which is used to derive Figures 4 and 5 in Section 5. Suppose we have n = 2m+ 1 jurors with
abilities, in nondecreasing order, given as the n-vector ~a = (a1, a2, . . . , an). Let N = {1, . . . , n}
and N i = N\{i}. If juror i has the casting vote, then the jurors N i who vote first are ordered
as the (n− 1)-vector ~ai = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an). Let Si denote the set of all m-subsets of
N i. A set S ∈ Si can be interpreted as the set of jurors who vote for alternative A in the first
round when there is a tie vote and juror i has the casting vote. The conditional probability
of A in this case is denoted θS . If θS = 1/2 then Q[i] = Q¯, where Q¯ is the reliability of
simultaneous voting (with abilities ~a) and Q[i] is the reliability of casting voting where juror i
has the casting vote. Of course, we have Q[i] ≥ Q¯ for all i ∈ N . If θS > 1/2 then for negative
signals close to 0, the casting voter i will still vote for A. The condition θS > 1/2 says roughly
that those m jurors who voted for A have collectively stronger abilities than those m jurors
who voted for B. For any j ∈ S, let rj = 1 − F (aj , 0) be the individual reliability of juror j,
the probability that he gets a positive signal and hence votes A when A is the state of Nature
(or the probability that juror j gets a negative signal given B). The probability that he gets a
negative signal given A (or a positive signal given B) is F (aj , 0) = 1− rj . Therefore, we have
θS =
∏
j∈S
rj
∏
k∈N i\S
(1− rk)∏
j∈S
rj
∏
k∈N i\S
(1− rk) +
∏
j∈S
(1− rj)
∏
k∈N i\S
rk
. (A-1)
Consequently, the honest threshold for casting voter i, given S, is
τi(S) =
1− 2θS
ai
∣∣∣∣
[−1,1]
, (A-2)
where z|[−1,1] denotes the projection of z onto [−1, 1]. We can also calculate the probability
that those voting A in the first round constitute a particular set S ∈ Si, given Nature is A:
Pr(S/A) =
∏
j∈S
rj
∏
k∈N i\S
(1− rk), for S ∈ Si. (A-3)
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To evaluate Q[i]− Q¯, we see that the verdict with casting voter i will be different from that of
simultaneous voting only if both of the following two conditions hold: (i) a tie vote (i.e., those
voting A, {j : sj > 0}, form a set S ∈ Si), and (ii) small signal for casting voter (i.e.,juror i
gets a signal si between his threshold τi(S) and 0). Taking equiprobable alternatives θ0 = 1/2
with juror i as the casting voter, let S = {j ∈ N i : sj > 0}, those who vote A in the first
round. Then the verdict is A if either |S| > m or |S| = m and si ≥ τi(S). Therefore, we have
the following formula for the reliability of voting with casting voter i:
Q[i] =
∑
S⊂N i, |S|≥m+1
Pr(S/A) +
∑
S⊂N i, |S|=m
Pr(S/A)(1− F (ai, τi(S))).
Similarly, for simultaneous voting we can separate out the voting of juror i to obtain the
asymmetric formula for the reliability Q¯:
Q¯ =
∑
S⊂N i, |S|≥m+1
Pr(S/A) +
∑
S⊂N i, |S|=m
Pr(S/A)(1− F (ai, 0)).
The difference between the above two formulae is that the latter involves only individual
reliabilities, whereas the former takes into account linear density functions on the full signal
distribution of the casting voter. In particular we have (noting that the conditions S ⊂ N i
and |S| = m are the same as S ∈ Si):
Q[i]− Q¯ =
∑
S∈Si
Pr(S/A)((1− F (ai, τi))− (1− F (ai, 0))) (A-4)
=
∑
S∈Si
Pr(S/A)(F (ai, 0)− F (ai, τi(S))).
In the case of n = 3 with i = 3 having the casting vote and a1 = a, a2 = b, a3 = c, there
are two sets in S3, namely {1} (which is voting pattern AB) and {2} (which is BA). There is
one set S ⊆ {1, 2} with |S| = m+ 1 = 2, namely {1, 2}. So evaluating the general formula for
Q[i] = Q[3] with the terms S in order {1, 2}, {1}, {2} gives (with τ3({1}) = zAB)
Q(a, b, c) = (1− F (a, 0))(1− F (b, 0)) + [(1− F (a, 0))(F (b, 0))](1− F (c, zAB))
+ ((F (a, 0))(1− F (b, 0)))(1− F (c, zBA))
Note that the advantage of formula (A-4) is that we have fewer terms to evaluate to see
which is the best juror i to have the casting vote.
A.4 Computational Results for Theorems 3 and 4
Computational results for reliability values of different casting voters are listed in Table A-1,
in which both Qˆ of strategic voting and Q of honest voting are put in the same row for easy
comparison for different ability sets. To ensure accurate comparison, exact (fractional) numbers
are also provided (in Table A-2) for honest voting in addition to decimal numbers. For strategic
voting, not every reliability is a rational number. However, in all cases where six decimal places
are not sufficient for relevant comparison stated in Theorems 3 and 4, the corresponding
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reliability values are all rational numbers and they are the same as those corresponding values
in Table A-2. For simplicity we use i to represent ability i/10 (i = 0, 1, . . . , 10) in the two
tables. In both Tables A-1 and A-2, symbol “−” denotes the same reliability value as that of
median-ability casting voter on the same row.
Table A-1: Reliability comparison for different casting voters
{a, b, c} Honest Voting Strategic Voting
a ≤ b ≤ c a last b last c last a last b last c last
{0,0,0} - 0.5 - - 0.5 -
{0,0,1} - 0.525 0.5125 - 0.525 -
{0,0,2} - 0.55 0.525 - 0.55 -
{0,0,3} - 0.575 0.5375 - 0.575 -
{0,0,4} - 0.6 0.55 - 0.6 -
{0,0,5} - 0.625 0.5625 - 0.625 -
{0,0,6} - 0.65 0.575 - 0.65 -
{0,0,7} - 0.675 0.5875 - 0.675 -
{0,0,8} - 0.7 0.6 - 0.7 -
{0,0,9} - 0.725 0.6125 - 0.725 -
{0,0,10} - 0.75 0.625 - 0.75 -
{0,1,1} 0.525 0.528125 - - 0.52963 -
{0,1,2} - 0.55 0.539063 - 0.55 -
{0,1,3} - 0.575 0.551042 - 0.575 -
{0,1,4} - 0.6 0.563281 - 0.6 -
{0,1,5} - 0.625 0.575625 - 0.625 -
{0,1,6} - 0.65 0.588021 - 0.65 -
{0,1,7} - 0.675 0.600446 - 0.675 -
{0,1,8} - 0.7 0.612891 - 0.7 -
{0,1,9} - 0.725 0.625347 - 0.725 -
{0,1,10} - 0.75 0.637813 - 0.75 -
{0,2,2} 0.55 0.55625 - - 0.559259 -
{0,2,3} 0.575 0.576562 0.566667 - 0.57716 -
{0,2,4} - 0.6 0.578125 - 0.6 -
{0,2,5} - 0.625 0.59 - 0.625 -
{0,2,6} - 0.65 0.602083 - 0.65 -
{0,2,7} - 0.675 0.614286 - 0.675 -
{0,2,8} - 0.7 0.626563 - 0.7 -
{0,2,9} - 0.725 0.638889 - 0.725 -
{0,2,10} - 0.75 0.65125 - 0.75 -
{0,3,3} 0.575 0.584375 - - 0.588889 -
{0,3,4} 0.6 0.604167 0.594531 - 0.605864 -
{0,3,5} 0.625 0.626042 0.605625 - 0.62642 -
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{a, b, c} Honest Voting Strategic Voting
a ≤ b ≤ c a last b last c last a last b last c last
{0,3,6} - 0.65 0.617188 - 0.65 -
{0,3,7} - 0.675 0.629018 - 0.675 -
{0,3,8} - 0.7 0.641016 - 0.7 -
{0,3,9} - 0.725 0.653125 - 0.725 -
{0,3,10} - 0.75 0.665312 - 0.75 -
{0,4,4} 0.6 0.6125 - - 0.618519 -
{0,4,5} 0.625 0.632031 0.6225 - 0.635 -
{0,4,6} 0.65 0.653125 0.633333 - 0.654321 -
{0,4,7} 0.675 0.675781 0.644643 - 0.676058 -
{0,4,8} - 0.7 0.65625 - 0.7 -
{0,4,9} - 0.725 0.668056 - 0.725 -
{0,4,10} - 0.75 0.68 - 0.75 -
{0,5,5} 0.625 0.640625 - - 0.648148 -
{0,5,6} 0.65 0.66 0.650521 - 0.664321 -
{0,5,7} 0.675 0.680625 0.661161 - 0.682857 -
{0,5,8} 0.7 0.7025 0.672266 - 0.703426 -
{0,5,9} 0.725 0.725625 0.683681 - 0.725844 -
{0,5,10} - 0.75 0.695313 - 0.75 -
{0,6,6} 0.65 0.66875 0.- - 0.677778 -
{0,6,7} 0.675 0.688021 0.678571 - 0.693739 -
{0,6,8} 0.7 0.708333 0.689063 - 0.711728 -
{0,6,9} 0.725 0.729688 0.7 - 0.731481 -
{0,6,10} 0.75 0.752083 0.71125 - 0.75284 -
{0,7,7} 0.675 0.696875 - - 0.707407 -
{0,7,8} 0.7 0.716071 0.706641 - 0.723214 -
{0,7,9} 0.725 0.736161 0.717014 - 0.7408 -
{0,7,10} 0.75 0.757143 0.727812 - 0.759947 -
{0,8,8} 0.7 0.725 - - 0.737037 -
{0,8,9} 0.725 0.744141 0.734722 - 0.752726 -
{0,8,10} 0.75 0.764063 0.745 - 0.77 -
{0,9,9} 0.725 0.753125 - - 0.766667 -
{0,9,10} 0.75 0.772222 0.762812 - 0.782263 -
{0,10,10} 0.75 0.78125 - - 0.796296 -
{1,1,1} - 0.537469 - - 0.537469 -
{1,1,2} - 0.553078 0.549938 - 0.553078 0.55
{1,1,3} - 0.575 0.562406 - 0.575236 0.575
{1,1,4} - 0.6 0.574875 - 0.6 -
{1,1,5} - 0.625 0.587344 - 0.625 -
{1,1,6} - 0.65 0.599813 - 0.65 -
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{a, b, c} Honest Voting Strategic Voting
a ≤ b ≤ c a last b last c last a last b last c last
{1,1,7} - 0.675 0.612281 - 0.675 -
{1,1,8} - 0.7 0.62475 - 0.7 -
{1,1,9} - 0.725 0.637219 - 0.725 -
{1,1,10} - 0.75 0.649687 - 0.75 -
{1,2,2} 0.562375 0.563945 - 0.562375 0.563945 -
{1,2,3} 0.577985 0.58111 0.575859 0.578765 0.58111 0.57716
{1,2,4} 0.6 0.601455 0.588035 0.600986 0.601455 0.6
{1,2,5} - 0.625 0.600316 - 0.625096 0.625
{1,2,6} - 0.65 0.612648 - 0.65 -
{1,2,7} - 0.675 0.625011 - 0.675 -
{1,2,8} - 0.7 0.637393 - 0.7 -
{1,2,9} - 0.725 0.649786 - 0.725 -
{1,2,10} - 0.75 0.662189 - 0.75 -
{1,3,3} 0.587219 0.591417 - 0.588889 0.591417 -
{1,3,4} 0.602847 0.609095 0.602774 0.60629 0.609095 0.605864
{1,3,5} 0.625 0.628909 0.61455 0.627356 0.628909 0.62642
{1,3,6} 0.65 0.650876 0.626537 0.650587 0.650876 0.65
{1,3,7} - 0.675 0.638643 - 0.675046 0.675
{1,3,8} - 0.7 0.650824 - 0.7 -
{1,3,9} - 0.725 0.663056 - 0.725 -
{1,3,10} - 0.75 0.675322 - 0.75 -
{1,4,4} 0.612 0.619102 - 0.618519 0.619102 -
{1,4,5} 0.627664 0.637033 0.630057 0.635 0.637033 0.635
{1,4,6} 0.65 0.656579 0.641485 0.654544 0.656579 0.654321
{1,4,7} 0.675 0.677751 0.653183 0.67665 0.677751 0.676058
{1,4,8} 0.7 0.700563 0.665051 0.700376 0.700562 0.7
{1,4,9} - 0.725 0.677032 - 0.72502 0.725
{1,4,10} - 0.75 0.689091 - 0.75 -
{1,5,5} 0.636719 0.646845 - - 0.648148 -
{1,5,6} 0.652441 0.664925 0.657501 0.664321 0.664925 0.664321
{1,5,7} 0.675 0.684307 0.66864 0.682857 0.684307 0.682857
{1,5,8} 0.7 0.705 0.680079 0.703522 0.705 0.703426
{1,5,9} 0.725 0.727014 0.69172 0.726213 0.727014 0.725844
{1,5,10} 0.75 0.750361 0.703501 0.750241 0.750361 0.75
{1,6,6} 0.661375 0.674594 - - 0.677778 -
{1,6,7} 0.677179 0.692771 0.685018 - 0.693739 -
{1,6,8} 0.7 0.712042 0.695914 0.711728 0.712042 0.711728
{1,6,9} 0.725 0.732413 0.707125 0.731481 0.732413 0.731481
{1,6,10} 0.75 0.753894 0.718556 0.75286 0.753894 0.75284
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{a, b, c} Honest Voting Strategic Voting
a ≤ b ≤ c a last b last c last a last b last c last
{1,7,7} 0.685969 0.702326 - - 0.707407 -
{1,7,8} 0.701884 0.720571 0.712563 - 0.723214 -
{1,7,9} 0.725 0.73976 0.723254 - 0.7408 -
{1,7,10} 0.75 0.7599 0.734263 - 0.759947 -
{1,8,8} 0.7105 0.730031 - - 0.737037 -
{1,8,9} 0.726561 0.748325 0.740111 - 0.752726 -
{1,8,10} 0.75 0.767452 0.750625 - 0.77 -
{1,9,9} 0.734969 0.757702 - - 0.766667 -
{1,9,10} 0.75122 0.776034 0.767648 - 0.782263 -
{1,10,10} 0.759375 0.785337 - - 0.796296 -
{2,2,2} - 0.57475 - - 0.57475 -
{2,2,3} - 0.588711 0.587125 - 0.588711 0.587125
{2,2,4} - 0.605878 0.5995 - 0.605878 0.6
{2,2,5} - 0.626298 0.611875 - 0.626585 0.625
{2,2,6} - 0.65 0.62425 - 0.650385 0.65
{2,2,7} - 0.675 0.636625 - 0.675026 0.675
{2,2,8} - 0.7 0.649 - 0.7 -
{2,2,9} - 0.725 0.661375 - 0.725 -
{2,2,10} - 0.75 0.67375 - 0.75 -
{2,3,3} 0.599438 0.600495 - 0.599437 0.600495 -
{2,3,4} 0.613361 0.616002 0.612543 0.613361 0.616002 0.612543
{2,3,5} 0.630556 0.633678 0.624697 0.630573 0.633678 0.62642
{2,3,6} 0.6511 0.653557 0.636904 0.652478 0.653557 0.65
{2,3,7} 0.675 0.675674 0.649141 - 0.675872 0.675
{2,3,8} - 0.7 0.661397 - 0.700177 0.7
{2,3,9} - 0.725 0.673665 - 0.725005 0.725
{2,3,10} - 0.75 0.685942 - 0.75 -
{2,4,4} 0.624 0.627189 - 0.624 0.627189 -
{2,4,5} 0.637895 0.643462 0.638801 0.637927 0.643462 0.638801
{2,4,6} 0.655149 0.661387 0.650626 0.657097 0.661387 0.654321
{2,4,7} 0.675871 0.68099 0.662572 0.678667 0.68099 0.676058
{2,4,8} 0.7 0.702297 0.674594 0.701586 0.702297 0.7
{2,4,9} 0.725 0.725335 0.686667 - 0.725496 0.725
{2,4,10} - 0.75 0.698776 - 0.750072 0.75
{2,5,5} 0.648438 0.654207 - 0.648986 0.654207 -
{2,5,6} 0.662314 0.670934 0.665433 0.665122 0.670934 0.665433
{2,5,7} 0.679662 0.689004 0.676933 0.68427 0.689004 0.682857
{2,5,8} 0.700625 0.708438 0.688606 0.705221 0.708437 0.703426
{2,5,9} 0.725 0.729256 0.700393 0.727577 0.729256 0.725844
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a ≤ b ≤ c a last b last c last a last b last c last
{2,5,10} 0.75 0.75148 0.71226 0.75102 0.75148 0.75
{2,6,6} 0.67275 0.681341 - 0.677778 0.681341 -
{2,6,7} 0.686621 0.698368 0.692239 0.693776 0.698368 0.693739
{2,6,8} 0.704102 0.716531 0.703443 0.712087 0.716531 0.711728
{2,6,9} 0.725382 0.735848 0.714852 0.732267 0.735848 0.731481
{2,6,10} 0.75 0.756338 0.726405 0.753941 0.756338 0.75284
{2,7,7} 0.696938 0.708503 -3 0.707407 0.708503 -
{2,7,8} 0.710817 0.725741 0.71912 0.723214 0.725741 0.723214
{2,7,9} 0.728481 0.743968 0.730058 0.7408 0.743968 0.7408
{2,7,10} 0.75017 0.7632 0.741221 0.760029 0.7632 0.759947
{2,8,8} 0.721 0.735648 - - 0.737037 -
{2,8,9} 0.734905 0.753043 0.746021 0.752726 0.753043 0.752726
{2,8,10} 0.752812 0.771316 0.756719 0.77 0.771316 0.77
{2,9,9} 0.744938 0.762753 - - 0.766667 -
{2,9,10} 0.758891 0.780267 0.772909 - 0.782263 -
{2,10,10} 0.76875 0.789803 - - 0.796296 -
{3,3,3} - 0.611656 - - 0.611656 -
{3,3,4} - 0.624949 0.623875 - 0.624949 0.623875
{3,3,5} - 0.640423 0.636094 - 0.640423 0.636094
{3,3,6} - 0.658129 0.648312 - 0.658129 0.65
{3,3,7} - 0.678121 0.660531 - 0.678122 0.675
{3,3,8} - 0.700454 0.67275 - 0.701285 0.7
{3,3,9} - 0.725 0.684969 - 0.725384 0.725
{3,3,10} - 0.75 0.697188 - 0.750049 0.75
{3,4,4} 0.636 0.636805 - 0.636 0.636805 -
{3,4,5} 0.649221 0.651372 0.648769 0.649221 0.651372 0.648769
{3,4,6} 0.664683 0.667613 0.660787 0.664683 0.667613 0.660787
{3,4,7} 0.682456 0.685568 0.672835 0.682456 0.685568 0.676058
{3,4,8} 0.702616 0.705278 0.684903 0.703782 0.705278 0.7
{3,4,9} 0.725242 0.726786 0.696983 0.726803 0.726811 0.725
{3,4,10} 0.75 0.750135 0.709072 - 0.750668 0.75
{3,5,5} 0.660156 0.662754 - 0.660156 0.662754 -
{3,5,6} 0.673314 0.678078 0.674352 0.673314 0.678078 0.674352
{3,5,7} 0.688785 0.694773 0.686074 0.688785 0.694773 0.686074
{3,5,8} 0.706667 0.712872 0.697873 0.708058 0.712872 0.703426
{3,5,9} 0.727061 0.73241 0.709724 0.729716 0.73241 0.725844
{3,5,10} 0.750074 0.753421 0.721611 0.752441 0.753421 0.75
{3,6,6} 0.684125 0.689033 - 0.684125 0.689033 -
{3,6,7} 0.697226 0.704858 0.70027 0.697305 0.704858 0.70027
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a ≤ b ≤ c a last b last c last a last b last c last
{3,6,8} 0.712735 0.721852 0.711681 0.714591 0.721852 0.712043
{3,6,9} 0.730776 0.740045 0.72321 0.734597 0.740045 0.731481
{3,6,10} 0.751483 0.759465 0.73482 0.755876 0.759465 0.75284
{3,7,7} 0.707906 0.715445 - 0.708711 0.715445 -
{3,7,8} 0.720961 0.731623 0.726346 0.723999 0.731623 0.726346
{3,7,9} 0.736539 0.748829 0.737457 0.742031 0.748829 0.7408
{3,7,10} 0.754801 0.767086 0.748715 0.761553 0.767086 0.759947
{3,8,8} 0.7315 0.741889 - 0.737037 0.741889 -
{3,8,9} 0.74452 0.75833 0.752485 0.752754 0.75833 0.752896
{3,8,10} 0.760208 0.775693 0.763311 0.770194 0.775693 0.77
{3,9,9} 0.754906 0.768311 - 0.766667 0.768311 -
{3,9,10} 0.767907 0.784956 0.778627 0.782263 0.784956 0.782263
{3,10,10} 0.778125 0.794679 - - 0.796296 -
{4,4,4} - 0.648 - - 0.648 -
{4,4,5} - 0.660822 0.66 - 0.660822 0.66
{4,4,6} - 0.675324 0.672 - 0.675324 0.672
{4,4,7} - 0.69156 0.684 - 0.69156 0.684
{4,4,8} - 0.709587 0.696 - 0.709587 0.7
{4,4,9} - 0.729463 0.708 - 0.729463 0.725
{4,4,10} - 0.75125 0.72 - 0.752107 0.75
{4,5,5} 0.671875 0.672533 - 0.671875 0.672533 -
{4,5,6} 0.684595 0.68641 0.684298 0.684595 0.68641 0.684298
{4,5,7} 0.69905 0.701673 0.696095 0.69905 0.701673 0.696095
{4,5,8} 0.715313 0.71837 0.707911 0.715313 0.71837 0.707911
{4,5,9} 0.73346 0.736545 0.71974 0.73346 0.736545 0.725844
{4,5,10} 0.753571 0.75625 0.731579 0.75464 0.75625 0.75
{4,6,6} 0.6955 0.697716 - 0.6955 0.697716 -
{4,6,7} 0.708123 0.71229 0.70915 0.708123 0.71229 0.70915
{4,6,8} 0.722551 0.728058 0.720662 0.722551 0.728058 0.720662
{4,6,9} 0.738879 0.745059 0.732228 0.73888 0.745059 0.732689
{4,6,10} 0.757206 0.763333 0.74383 0.758559 0.763333 0.75284
{4,7,7} 0.718875 0.723195 - 0.718875 0.723195 -
{4,7,8} 0.731408 0.738264 0.73428 0.731408 0.738264 0.73428
{4,7,9} 0.745834 0.75439 0.745485 0.745985 0.75439 0.745485
{4,7,10} 0.762273 0.771607 0.756774 0.764227 0.771607 0.759947
{4,8,8} 0.742 0.748793 - 0.742014 0.748793 -
{4,8,9} 0.754453 0.764231 0.759539 0.755271 0.764231 0.759539
{4,8,10} 0.768906 0.780625 0.770435 0.772085 0.780625 0.77088
{4,9,9} 0.764875 0.774414 - 0.767326 0.774414 -
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{4,9,10} 0.777258 0.790139 0.784835 0.782642 0.790139 0.784835
{4,10,10} 0.7875 0.8 - 0.796296 0.8 -
{5,5,5} - 0.683594 - - 0.683594 -
{5,5,6} - 0.695988 0.695313 - 0.695988 0.695313
{5,5,7} - 0.709771 0.707031 - 0.709771 0.707031
{5,5,8} - 0.725 0.71875 - 0.725 0.71875
{5,5,9} - 0.741736 0.730469 - 0.741736 0.730556
{5,5,10} - 0.760045 0.742188 - 0.760045 0.75
{5,6,6} 0.706875 0.707438 - 0.706875 0.707438 -
{5,6,7} 0.719136 0.720721 0.71892 0.719136 0.720721 0.71892
{5,6,8} 0.732841 0.735208 0.730422 0.732841 0.735208 0.730422
{5,6,9} 0.748065 0.750952 0.741938 0.748065 0.750952 0.741938
{5,6,10} 0.76489 0.768006 0.753463 0.76489 0.768006 0.754718
{5,7,7} 0.729844 0.731801 - 0.729844 0.731801 -
{5,7,8} 0.741977 0.745714 0.742962 0.741977 0.745714 0.742962
{5,7,9} 0.755624 0.760705 0.754178 0.755624 0.760705 0.754178
{5,7,10} 0.770881 0.776818 0.765432 0.770881 0.776818 0.765432
{5,8,8} 0.7525 0.756406 - 0.7525 0.756406 -
{5,8,9} 0.764512 0.770792 0.767222 0.764512 0.770792 0.767222
{5,8,10} 0.778125 0.786161 0.778125 0.778125 0.786161 0.778125
{5,9,9} 0.774844 0.781104 - 0.774844 0.781104 -
{5,9,10} 0.786744 0.795858 0.791571 0.787026 0.795858 0.791571
{5,10,10} 0.796875 0.805804 - 0.798377 0.805804 -
{6,6,6} - 0.71825 - - 0.71825 -
{6,6,7} - 0.730207 0.729625 - 0.730207 0.729625
{6,6,8} - 0.743367 0.741 - 0.743367 0.741
{6,6,9} - 0.757794 0.752375 - 0.757794 0.752375
{6,6,10} - 0.773554 0.76375 - 0.773554 0.76375
{6,7,7} 0.740813 0.741311 - 0.740813 0.741311 -
{6,7,8} 0.752606 0.754029 0.752436 0.752606 0.754029 0.752436
{6,7,9} 0.76566 0.767832 0.763575 0.76566 0.767832 0.763575
{6,7,10} 0.780057 0.782778 0.774724 0.780057 0.782778 0.774724
{6,8,8} 0.763 0.764776 - 0.763 0.764776 -
{6,8,9} 0.774635 0.778064 0.775578 0.774635 0.778064 0.775578
{6,8,10} 0.787604 0.792353 0.78642 0.787604 0.792353 0.78642
{6,9,9} 0.784813 0.788425 - 0.784812 0.788425 -
{6,9,10} 0.796297 0.802161 0.798876 0.796297 0.802161 0.798876
{6,10,10} 0.80625 0.812132 - 0.80625 0.812132 -
{7,7,7} - 0.751781 - - 0.751781 -
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{7,7,8} - 0.763269 0.76275 - 0.763269 0.76275
{7,7,9} - 0.775838 0.773719 - 0.775838 0.773719
{7,7,10} - 0.789558 0.784688 - 0.789558 0.784687
{7,8,8} 0.7735 0.773954 - 0.7735 0.773954 -
{7,8,9} 0.784794 0.786105 0.784654 0.784794 0.786105 0.784654
{7,8,10} 0.797232 0.799261 0.795363 0.797232 0.799261 0.795363
{7,9,9} 0.794781 0.79643 - 0.794781 0.79643 -
{7,9,10} 0.805889 0.8091 0.806796 0.805889 0.8091 0.806796
{7,10,10} 0.815625 0.819034 - 0.815625 0.819034 -
{8,8,8} - 0.784 - - 0.784 -
{8,8,9} - 0.794976 0.7945 - 0.794976 0.7945
{8,8,10} - 0.806953 0.805 - 0.806953 0.805
{8,9,9} 0.80475 0.805173 - 0.80475 0.805173 -
{8,9,10} 0.815504 0.816736 0.815381 0.815504 0.816736 0.815381
{8,10,10} 0.825 0.826562 - 0.825 0.826562 -
{9,9,9} - 0.814719 - - 0.814719 -
{9,9,10} - 0.825136 0.824687 - 0.825136 0.824687
{9,10,10} 0.834375 0.834778 - 0.834375 0.834778 -
{10,10,10} - 0.84375 - - 0.84375 -
Table A-2: Exact reliability values for different casting voters
under honest voting
{a, b, c} Honest Voting {a, b, c} Honest Voting
a ≤ b ≤ c a last b last c last a ≤ b ≤ c a last b last c last
{0,0,0} − 12 − {0,0,1} − 2140 4180
{0,0,2} − 1120 2140 {0,0,3} − 2340 4380
{0,0,4} − 35 1120 {0,0,5} − 58 916
{0,0,6} − 1320 2340 {0,0,7} − 2740 4780
{0,0,8} − 710 35 {0,0,9} − 2940 4980
{0,0,10} − 34 58 {0,1,1} 2140 169320 −
{0,1,2} − 1120 69128 {0,1,3} − 2340 529960
{0,1,4} − 35 7211280 {0,1,5} − 58 9211600
{0,1,6} − 1320 11291920 {0,1,7} − 2740 269448
{0,1,8} − 710 15692560 {0,1,9} − 2940 18012880
{0,1,10} − 34 20413200 {0,2,2} 1120 89160 −
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Table A-2: continued from previous page
{a, b, c} Honest Voting {a, b, c} Honest Voting
a ≤ b ≤ c a last b last c last a ≤ b ≤ c a last b last c last
{0,2,3} 2340
369
640
17
30 {0,2,4} − 35 3764
{0,2,5} − 58 59100 {0,2,6} − 1320 289480
{0,2,7} − 2740 4370 {0,2,8} − 710 401640
{0,2,9} − 2940 2336 {0,2,10} − 34 521800
{0,3,3} 2340
187
320 − {0,3,4} 35 2948 7611280
{0,3,5} 58
601
960
969
1600 {0,3,6} − 1320 79128
{0,3,7} − 2740 14092240 {0,3,8} − 710 16412560
{0,3,9} − 2940 209320 {0,3,10} − 34 21293200
{0,4,4} 35
49
80 − {0,4,5} 58 8091280 249400
{0,4,6} 1320
209
320
19
30 {0,4,7}
27
40
173
256
361
560
{0,4,8} − 710 2132 {0,4,9} − 2940 481720
{0,4,10} − 34 1725 {0,5,5} 58 4164 −
{0,5,6} 1320
33
50
1249
1920 {0,5,7}
27
40
1089
1600
1481
2240
{0,5,8} 710
281
400
1721
2560 {0,5,9}
29
40
1161
1600
1969
2880
{0,5,10} − 34 89128 {0,6,6} 1320 107160 −
{0,6,7} 2740
1321
1920
19
28 {0,6,8}
7
10
17
24
441
640
{0,6,9} 2940
467
640
7
10 {0,6,10}
3
4
361
480
569
800
{0,7,7} 2740
223
320 − {0,7,8} 710 401560 18092560
{0,7,9} 2940
1649
2240
413
576 {0,7,10}
3
4
53
70
2329
3200
{0,8,8} 710
29
40 − {0,8,9} 2940 381512 529720
{0,8,10} 34
489
640
149
200 {0,9,9}
29
40
241
320 −
{0,9,10} 34
139
180
2441
3200 {0,10,10}
3
4
25
32 −
{1,1,1} − 1719932000 − {1,1,2} − 17610013184000 879916000
{1,1,3} − 2340 1799732000 {1,1,4} − 35 45998000
{1,1,5} − 58 37596400 {1,1,6} − 1320 959716000
{1,1,7} − 2740 1959332000 {1,1,8} − 710 24994000
{1,1,9} − 2940 2039132000 {1,1,10} − 34 20793200
{1,2,2} 44998000
897801
1592000 − {1,2,3} 18218093152000 36912096352000 55006099552000
{1,2,4} 35
827
1375
117019
199000 {1,2,5} − 58 382281636800
{1,2,6} − 1320 29260094776000 {1,2,7} − 2740 1393024922288000
{1,2,8} − 710 10147291592000 {1,2,9} − 2940 1862028128656000
{1,2,10} − 34 210841318400 {1,3,3} 1879132000 2254008138112000 −
{1,3,4} 467809776000
160801
264000
1914409
3176000 {1,3,5}
5
8
953929
1516800
1561449
2540800
{1,3,6} 1320
6154681
9456000
11939281
19056000 {1,3,7} − 2740 5679324188928000
{1,3,8} − 710 10335091588000 {1,3,9} − 2940 75811129114336000
{1,3,10} − 34 8579291270400 {1,4,4} 153250 5448188000 −
{1,4,5} 1908130400
80521
126400
11089
17600 {1,4,6}
13
20
64673
98500
21169
33000
{1,4,7} 2740
710283
1048000
402361
616000 {1,4,8}
7
10
11209
16000
117049
176000
{1,4,9} − 2940 536209792000 {1,4,10} − 34 379550
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Table A-2: continued from previous page
{a, b, c} Honest Voting {a, b, c} Honest Voting
a ≤ b ≤ c a last b last c last a ≤ b ≤ c a last b last c last
{1,5,5} 163256
65409
101120 − {1,5,6} 77249118400 419169630400 498649758400
{1,5,7} 2740
573723
838400
2366449
3539200 {1,5,8}
7
10
141
200
42981
63200
{1,5,9} 2940
1819281
2502400
3147601
4550400 {1,5,10}
3
4
6243
8320
35569
50560
{1,6,6} 52918000
3189481
4728000 − {1,6,7} 19394412864000 14520492096000 1511424122064000
{1,6,8} 710
17089
24000
1096761
1576000 {1,6,9}
29
40
13745929
18768000
20059729
28368000
{1,6,10} 34
15681
20800
226489
315200 {1,7,7}
21951
32000
20609067
29344000 −
{1,7,8} 3018143000
1261
1750
373383
524000 {1,7,9}
29
40
64791169
87584000
9095641
12576000
{1,7,10} 34
221283
291200
307803
419200 {1,8,8}
1421
2000
23361
32000
23361
32000
{1,8,9} 2978941000
1170381
1564000
6661
9000 {1,8,10}
3
4
15963
20800
1201
1600
{1,9,9} 2351932000
85323361
112608000 − {1,9,10} 7452199200 3228341600 9604811251200
{1,10,10} 243320
3267
4160 − {2,2,2} − 22994000 −
{2,2,3} − 9278091576000 46978000 {2,2,4} − 37116125 11992000
{2,2,5} − 1302720800 9791600 {2,2,6} − 1320 24974000
{2,2,7} − 2740 50938000 {2,2,8} − 710 6491000
{2,2,9} − 2940 52918000 {2,2,10} − 34 539800
{2,3,3} 959116000
5678281
9456000 − {2,3,4} 743712125 362209588000 120671197000
{2,3,5} 155369246400
26361
41600
393809
630400 {2,3,6}
994881
1528000
1521481
2328000
3011281
4728000
{2,3,7} 2740
6259441
9264000
14322641
22064000 {2,3,8} − 710 10423611576000
{2,3,9} − 2940 1911052928368000 {2,3,10} − 34 216209315200
{2,4,4} 78125
122929
196000 − {2,4,5} 303475 16732600 2504139200
{2,4,6} 38495875
128309
194000
47821
73500 {2,4,7}
2619
3875
131431
193000
909049
1372000
{2,4,8} 710
44947
64000
264441
392000 {2,4,9}
29
40
138539
191000
1211281
1764000
{2,4,10} − 34 8561225 {2,5,5} 83128 54438320 −
{2,5,6} 3920959200
104129
155200
13841
20800 {2,5,7}
158769
233600
425529
617600
197123
291200
{2,5,8} 11211600
2267
3200
14323
20800 {2,5,9}
29
40
445721
611200
87409
124800
{2,5,10} 34
4569
6080
2963
4160 {2,6,6}
2691
4000
793081
1164000 −
{2,6,7} 9832411432000
3234841
4632000
3760241
5432000 {2,6,8}
61961
88000
22929
32000
34117
48500
{2,6,9} 10039291384000
3373129
4584000
4992529
6984000 {2,6,10}
3
4
34489
45600
56369
77600
{2,7,7} 1115116000
15315001
21616000 − {2,7,8} 244521344000 81283112000 11103211544000
{2,7,9} 39279695392000
2273567
3056000
20289769
27792000 {2,7,10}
13203
17600
162409
212800
228889
308800
{2,8,8} 7211000
94163
128000 − {2,8,9} 241049328000 11506491528000 3580948000
{2,8,10} 24093200
2931
3800
4843
6400 {2,9,9}
11919
16000
20978761
27504000 −
{2,9,10} 3764149600
213481
273600
236201
305600 {2,10,10}
123
160
2401
3040 −
{3,3,3} − 1957332000 − {3,3,4} − 14548812328000 49918000
{3,3,5} − 9468011478400 40716400 {3,3,6} − 20112433056000 1037316000
{3,3,7} − 2467276936384000 2113732000 {3,3,8} − 2469135250 26914000
{3,3,9} − 2940 2191932000 {3,3,10} − 34 22313200
{3,4,4} 159250
494161
776000 − {3,4,5} 5920991200 80249123200 100689155200
{3,4,6} 374881564000
63757
95500
192289
291000 {3,4,7}
169249
248000
2078641
3032000
3654841
5432000
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Table A-2: continued from previous page
{a, b, c} Honest Voting {a, b, c} Honest Voting
a ≤ b ≤ c a last b last c last a ≤ b ≤ c a last b last c last
{3,4,8} 96961138000
530369
752000
1062969
1552000 {3,4,9}
1583929
2184000
2168729
2984000
4867729
6984000
{3,4,10} 34
5551
7400
3439
4850 {3,5,5}
169
256
65321
98560 −
{3,5,6} 239161355200
414441
611200
498481
739200 {3,5,7}
965401
1401600
1685241
2425600
2366681
3449600
{3,5,8} 5375
6701
9400
42989
61600 {3,5,9}
991129
1363200
1748409
2387200
3147769
4435200
{3,5,10} 1008113440
17841
23680
35561
49280 {3,6,6}
5473
8000
1052843
1528000 −
{3,6,7} 59905698592000
12822769
18192000
14980169
21392000 {3,6,8}
94081
132000
814249
1128000
1087449
1528000
{3,6,9} 20227872768000
4416587
5968000
2210129
3056000 {3,6,10}
61321
81600
134881
177600
224561
305600
{3,7,7} 2265332000
60738409
84896000 − {3,7,8} 2325132250 3008841125 11011411516000
{3,7,9} 2382852132352000
62566121
83552000
80494921
109152000 {3,7,10}
26569
35200
90823
118400
908041
1212800
{3,8,8} 14632000
1115801
1504000 − {3,8,9} 1144715375 11314291492000 318301423000
{3,8,10} 36494800
45921
59200
57401
75200 {3,9,9}
24157
32000
9170561
11936000 −
{3,9,10} 228529297600
836449
1065600
929369
1193600 {3,10,10}
249
320
9409
11840 −
{4,4,4} − 81125 − {4,4,5} − 2008930400 3350
{4,4,6} − 126961188000 84125 {4,4,7} − 171507248000 171250
{4,4,8} − 3264146000 87125 {4,4,9} − 531049728000 177250
{4,4,10} − 601800 1825 {4,5,5} 4364 40896080 −
{4,5,6} 25333700
25809
37600
7801
11400 {4,5,7}
81649
116800
34803
49600
148129
212800
{4,5,8} 22893200
6609
9200
43041
60800 {4,5,9}
83321
113600
107241
145600
196921
273600
{4,5,10} 211280
121
160
139
190 {4,6,6}
1391
2000
49189
70500 −
{4,6,7} 6337789500
22081
31000
933241
1316000 {4,6,8}
127169
176000
12559
17250
270969
376000
{4,6,9} 6391386500
203401
273000
1238929
1692000 {4,6,10}
5149
6800
229
300
874
1175
{4,7,7} 57518000
1255467
1736000 − {4,7,8} 503209688000 237721322000 364203496000
{4,7,9} 20107692696000
3844369
5096000
554641
744000 {4,7,10}
1677
2200
4321
5600
1173
1550
{4,8,8} 371500
68889
92000 − {4,8,9} 494921656000 11127211456000 314449414000
{4,8,10} 49216400
1249
1600
443
575 {4,9,9}
6119
8000
5073961
6552000 −
{4,9,10} 48196200
5689
7200
3571
4550 {4,10,10}
63
80
4
5 −
{5,5,5} − 175256 − {5,5,6} − 1648123680 89128
{5,5,7} − 6632193440 181256 {5,5,8} − 2940 2332
{5,5,9} − 6740990880 187256 {5,5,10} − 681896 95128
{5,6,6} 11311600
125641
177600 − {5,6,7} 411921572800 505081700800 595841828800
{5,6,8} 64498800
3529
4800
43241
59200 {5,6,9}
414129
553600
511849
681600
790609
1065600
{5,6,10} 41615440
5161
6720
8921
11840 {5,7,7}
4671
6400
2393281
3270400 −
{5,7,8} 63818600
261
350
43389
58400 {5,7,9}
1629729
2156800
2419649
3180800
3171169
4204800
{5,7,10} 54277040
24361
31360
35761
46720 {5,8,8}
301
400
4841
6400 −
{5,8,9} 62698200
43781
56800
1381
1800 {5,8,10}
249
320
1761
2240
249
320
{5,9,9} 49596400
3194401
4089600 − {5,9,10} 1560919840 3208940320 3596945440
{5,10,10} 5164
361
448 − {6,6,6} − 28734000 −
{6,6,7} − 31369694296000 58378000 {6,6,8} − 196249264000 7411000
{6,6,9} − 10487871384000 60198000 {6,6,10} − 3156140800 611800
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Table A-2: continued from previous page
{a, b, c} Honest Voting {a, b, c} Honest Voting
a ≤ b ≤ c a last b last c last a ≤ b ≤ c a last b last c last
{6,7,7} 1185316000
14861809
20048000 − {6,7,8} 7766891032000 232241308000 10774891432000
{6,7,9} 1238532116176000
14877521
19376000
19681921
25776000 {6,7,10}
13729
17600
149041
190400
221881
286400
{6,8,8} 7631000
269201
352000 − {6,8,9} 762241984000 10768411384000 307129396000
{6,8,10} 75619600
1347
1700
13841
17600 {6,9,9}
12557
16000
2182361
2768000 −
{6,9,10} 118489148800
196369
244800
221129
276800 {6,10,10}
129
160
2209
2720 −
{7,7,7} − 2405732000 − {7,7,8} − 2871837625 30514000
{7,7,9} − 5856648175488000 2475932000 {7,7,10} − 194547246400 25113200
{7,8,8} 15472000
1064961
1376000 − {7,8,9} 5630971750 10596691348000 303661387000
{7,8,10} 892911200
14067
17600
54721
68800 {7,9,9}
25433
32000
77298289
97056000 −
{7,9,10} 559609694400
85441
105600
870049
1078400 {7,10,10}
261
320
2883
3520 −
{8,8,8} − 98125 − {8,8,9} − 10430091312000 15892000
{8,8,10} − 1032912800 161200 {8,9,9} 32194000 297109369000 −
{8,9,10} 4044949600
11761
14400
53489
65600 {8,10,10}
33
40
529
640 −
{9,9,9} − 2607132000 − {9,9,10} − 736681892800 26393200
{9,10,10} 267320
8281
9920 − {10,10,10} − 2732 −
33
